"Harrison immediately ordered the United States Secretary of War Stephen B. Elkins to address the situation under Article IV, Section 4, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which allows for the use of U.S. forces under the President's orders for "protection from invasion and domestic violence". The Sixth Cavalry from Fort McKinney near Buffalo was ordered to proceed to the TA ranch at once and take custody of the WSGA expedition. The 6th Cavalry left Fort McKinney a few hours later at 2 am on April 13 and reached the TA ranch at 6:45 am. The expedition surrendered to the Sixth soon after and was saved just as the posse had finished building a series of breastworks to shoot gunpowder on the invader's log barn shelter so that it could be set on fire from a distance. The Sixth Cavalry took possession of Walcott and 45 other men with 45 rifles, 41 revolvers and some 5,000 rounds of ammunition."posted by Happy Dave at 7:07 AM on November 2, 2010
Smith's remaining contention is that his sentencing violates the Domestic Violence Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. Suffice it to say that when that Clause speaks of "domestic Violence" it means insurrection, riots, and other forms of civil disorder. It has no application to the Congress's powers to regulate the possession of handguns under the Commerce Clause. Smith's argument is not only unconvincing--it borders on the frivolous.Federalist 43 also contains a short discussion of the clause:
Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature.The "recent and well-known event among ourselves" is Shays' Rebellion, so that should give you some sense of the scope of the clause.
At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a government; and consequently, that the federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy invoked the act four times between 1957 and 1963 to enforce desegregation laws in Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama. President George H.W. Bush invoked the act in 1989, federalizing National Guard units and deploying the 16th Military Police Brigade to restore order in the Virgin Islands in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. Finally, the first President Bush, at the request of the governor of California, invoked the Insurrection Act in 1992 to empower a federal joint task force to enforce the law during riots in Los Angeles.(Source). The Insurrection Act was based not on the Domestic Violence Clause but on the First Militia Clause: "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 Yale L.J. 149 (2004).
posted by Aizkolari at 7:02 AM on November 2, 2010