Help me find the essence of an argument against essentialism.
April 2, 2009 9:20 PM Subscribe
Essentialism vs. Anti-essentialism/Dialectical materialism?
I'm looking for a coherent argument against essentialism.
Basically, I realize that I've been thinking about things from a generally pomo/poststructuralist, Foucault/Derrida-influenced perspective for a while: that what we conceive of as fixed definitions/things are social constructs influenced by an economic base and the class struggles founded on this base; things don't have fixed essences; etc. etc. I want to elaborate to myself why I think essentialism isn't that great or incorrect, but it's sort of hard to argue why it isn't so when your system of thought is so fixed already.
One angle that comes to mind is that an essentialism is harmful from a social, pragmatic perspective; that an unquestionable and essential perception of, say, a fetus as a living human being would be harmful for pregnant mothers, etc. The fixed, unyielding character of essentialism would lead to harmful situations in which a flexibility (stemming from an understanding of values as socially constructed) would be helpful. This seems like a pretty messy argument, since it's not the philosophies themselves that are set in opposition but the varying applications of these philosophies.
It seems that the opposition between social constructionism/dialectical materialism and essentialism boils down to a pretty irrational "that isn't true -- essences do/don't exist!" on either end. Are these two ideas axiomatically opposed, and so am I being foolish by trying to seek a rational argument (other than a pragmatist one) for a judgment which is ultimately based on arbitrary opinion?
I'm looking for a coherent argument against essentialism.
Basically, I realize that I've been thinking about things from a generally pomo/poststructuralist, Foucault/Derrida-influenced perspective for a while: that what we conceive of as fixed definitions/things are social constructs influenced by an economic base and the class struggles founded on this base; things don't have fixed essences; etc. etc. I want to elaborate to myself why I think essentialism isn't that great or incorrect, but it's sort of hard to argue why it isn't so when your system of thought is so fixed already.
One angle that comes to mind is that an essentialism is harmful from a social, pragmatic perspective; that an unquestionable and essential perception of, say, a fetus as a living human being would be harmful for pregnant mothers, etc. The fixed, unyielding character of essentialism would lead to harmful situations in which a flexibility (stemming from an understanding of values as socially constructed) would be helpful. This seems like a pretty messy argument, since it's not the philosophies themselves that are set in opposition but the varying applications of these philosophies.
It seems that the opposition between social constructionism/dialectical materialism and essentialism boils down to a pretty irrational "that isn't true -- essences do/don't exist!" on either end. Are these two ideas axiomatically opposed, and so am I being foolish by trying to seek a rational argument (other than a pragmatist one) for a judgment which is ultimately based on arbitrary opinion?
I want to elaborate to myself why I think essentialism isn't that great or incorrect, but it's sort of hard to argue why it isn't so when your system of thought is so fixed already.
Darwin is good for this, minus some of the telltale signs of the Victorian age that he didn't escape. If you want to overcome the sense that there can only be a schoolyard "is not"/"is to" argument between essentialism and anti-essentialism, it can be helpful to read someone who is (a) one of the great anti-essentialists, but (b) not remotely committed to the ideology that there are no grand narratives, foundational truths, etc., etc.
posted by Beardman at 9:52 PM on April 2, 2009
Darwin is good for this, minus some of the telltale signs of the Victorian age that he didn't escape. If you want to overcome the sense that there can only be a schoolyard "is not"/"is to" argument between essentialism and anti-essentialism, it can be helpful to read someone who is (a) one of the great anti-essentialists, but (b) not remotely committed to the ideology that there are no grand narratives, foundational truths, etc., etc.
posted by Beardman at 9:52 PM on April 2, 2009
One angle that comes to mind is that an essentialism is harmful from a social, pragmatic perspective; that an unquestionable and essential perception of, say, a fetus as a living human being would be harmful for pregnant mothers, etc.
That's an argument from consequences. Argumentum ad consequentiam is generally considered invalid.
Just because a statement is distasteful doesn't mean it is false. Unpleasant truths do exist.
posted by Chocolate Pickle at 9:54 PM on April 2, 2009
That's an argument from consequences. Argumentum ad consequentiam is generally considered invalid.
Just because a statement is distasteful doesn't mean it is false. Unpleasant truths do exist.
posted by Chocolate Pickle at 9:54 PM on April 2, 2009
Response by poster: Yeah, Chocolate Pickle, I should have been more emphatic about rejecting that approach. Thanks for identifying the name of the fallacy.
Beardman: Yes, I should have been clearer. Let me restate my question.
In specific, my thoughts concern aesthetics/beauty and the definition of art. I've read Hume and Kant on aesthetics -- Hume's standard of taste and Kant's assertion of what beauty is in the Third Critique seem pretty universalizing to me. I see this declaration of a objective and universal standard of taste/beauty as generating a definition of art that is ultimately essentialist -- "since beauty is a universal, fixed concept, I can perceive that this creation doesn't contain the essence of beauty".
In opposition to Hume/Kant is, I guess is Adorno, Marcuse, Bourdieu, Ranciere, etc, -- all of whom seem to be influenced by Marx or Marxist scholars, in that they examine art and aesthetics from a materialist angle, at least, and go on to consider sociology/politics/theology in their conception of what art is and how it is defined and what function it serves. To me it seems that there's a decidedly anti-essentialist definition of art that arises if you agree with their arguments -- art is X, but in relation to this and that; art is something determined and influenced by socioeconomic stratifications, so on.
I personally take the latter view, as I think it's much more nuanced, much more aware of the political dynamics and partitions underlying art. How do I argue against the first one, though? I've been thinking of this quote:
"For dialectical criticism, the contradictions in the criticized theory are not indications of insufficient intellectual rigor on the part of the author, but an indication of an unsolved problem or one that has remained hidden. Dialectical criticism thus stands in a relation of dependency to the criticized theory. That also means, however, that it reaches its limit where such a theory cannot validate its claim to be a theory. All that remains to it is "rejection," as Hegel called it, whereby it also renounces its own claim to being a theory, for it can oppose the nontheory only as opinion."
Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde
So is that it? For people following a Kantian aesthetics, the notion of materialism concerning beauty and art is wrong -- because beauty is objective, detached, universal. For those who take this approach of dialectical materialism and dialectical criticism, art that is essentialist cannot be opposed with their critical and philosophical tools, since there is a disagreement at the level of ways of thinking. Does a debate between the two parties ultimately end in more or less eloquent formations of "I disagree because I think so"?
posted by suedehead at 10:47 PM on April 2, 2009 [1 favorite]
Beardman: Yes, I should have been clearer. Let me restate my question.
In specific, my thoughts concern aesthetics/beauty and the definition of art. I've read Hume and Kant on aesthetics -- Hume's standard of taste and Kant's assertion of what beauty is in the Third Critique seem pretty universalizing to me. I see this declaration of a objective and universal standard of taste/beauty as generating a definition of art that is ultimately essentialist -- "since beauty is a universal, fixed concept, I can perceive that this creation doesn't contain the essence of beauty".
In opposition to Hume/Kant is, I guess is Adorno, Marcuse, Bourdieu, Ranciere, etc, -- all of whom seem to be influenced by Marx or Marxist scholars, in that they examine art and aesthetics from a materialist angle, at least, and go on to consider sociology/politics/theology in their conception of what art is and how it is defined and what function it serves. To me it seems that there's a decidedly anti-essentialist definition of art that arises if you agree with their arguments -- art is X, but in relation to this and that; art is something determined and influenced by socioeconomic stratifications, so on.
I personally take the latter view, as I think it's much more nuanced, much more aware of the political dynamics and partitions underlying art. How do I argue against the first one, though? I've been thinking of this quote:
"For dialectical criticism, the contradictions in the criticized theory are not indications of insufficient intellectual rigor on the part of the author, but an indication of an unsolved problem or one that has remained hidden. Dialectical criticism thus stands in a relation of dependency to the criticized theory. That also means, however, that it reaches its limit where such a theory cannot validate its claim to be a theory. All that remains to it is "rejection," as Hegel called it, whereby it also renounces its own claim to being a theory, for it can oppose the nontheory only as opinion."
Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde
So is that it? For people following a Kantian aesthetics, the notion of materialism concerning beauty and art is wrong -- because beauty is objective, detached, universal. For those who take this approach of dialectical materialism and dialectical criticism, art that is essentialist cannot be opposed with their critical and philosophical tools, since there is a disagreement at the level of ways of thinking. Does a debate between the two parties ultimately end in more or less eloquent formations of "I disagree because I think so"?
posted by suedehead at 10:47 PM on April 2, 2009 [1 favorite]
Response by poster: BTW, please feel free to correct me along the way if I've made bad assumptions.
posted by suedehead at 10:48 PM on April 2, 2009
posted by suedehead at 10:48 PM on April 2, 2009
I've read most of the people you're referring to (not that much Derrida, I guess) but...
... what's 'essentialism'?
posted by koeselitz at 10:53 PM on April 2, 2009
... what's 'essentialism'?
posted by koeselitz at 10:53 PM on April 2, 2009
The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is an amazing resource for this kind of stuff. I found three relevant articles:
Species (particularly the section "The Death of Essentialism")
Essential vs. Accidental Properties
Arguments For Origin Essentialism
posted by sophist at 10:54 PM on April 2, 2009
Species (particularly the section "The Death of Essentialism")
Essential vs. Accidental Properties
Arguments For Origin Essentialism
posted by sophist at 10:54 PM on April 2, 2009
I see this declaration of a objective and universal standard of taste/beauty as generating a definition of art that is ultimately essentialist -- "since beauty is a universal, fixed concept, I can perceive that this creation doesn't contain the essence of beauty".
For whatever it's worth, that's empirically disprovable. There are many, many things that some think are beautiful and others think are trash.
By the same token, I'm hard pressed to think of anything that absolutely everyone would agree is beautiful.
If there is some universal fixed concept called "beauty" then it's useless, and largely irrelevant, because most people don't agree with it, and have their own meaning for the word.
(Um, hasn't this thread become chatfilter?)
posted by Chocolate Pickle at 10:58 PM on April 2, 2009
For whatever it's worth, that's empirically disprovable. There are many, many things that some think are beautiful and others think are trash.
By the same token, I'm hard pressed to think of anything that absolutely everyone would agree is beautiful.
If there is some universal fixed concept called "beauty" then it's useless, and largely irrelevant, because most people don't agree with it, and have their own meaning for the word.
(Um, hasn't this thread become chatfilter?)
posted by Chocolate Pickle at 10:58 PM on April 2, 2009
... second question - I'm not being flippant - what is dialectical materialism? The perspective of a mediavalist and classicist, I know, but it seems like the biggest problem with philosophy today is the obsession with jargon. All critiques of contemporary thought aside, however, it does at least seem as though you should define your terms to begin with. There are at least a dozen different definitions of 'essentialism' and 'dialectical materialism' between Adorno, Husserl, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and whomever else one can come up with; we should know what we're talking about, right?
posted by koeselitz at 10:59 PM on April 2, 2009 [1 favorite]
posted by koeselitz at 10:59 PM on April 2, 2009 [1 favorite]
If I understand it correctly, Essentialism is the idea that things in the world have an "essence", that a human is at some metaphysical level somehow different than a rock, that objects in the world possess essential properties which are more than just a random collection of particles floating around. This idea has always struck as particularly wrongheaded, but it pops up all over the place in philosophy, from philosophy of language to history to politics, mind, etc.
From wiki:
In philosophy, essentialism is the view that, for any specific kind of entity, there is a set of characteristics or properties all of which any entity of that kind must possess. This view is contrasted with non-essentialism, which states that, for any given kind of entity, there are no specific traits which entities of that kind must possess.
According to essentialism, a member of a specific kind of entity may possess other characteristics that are neither needed to establish its membership nor preclude its membership, but that essences do not simply reflect ways of grouping objects; essences must result in properties of the object.
An essence characterizes a substance or a form, in the sense of the Forms or Ideas in Platonic idealism. It is permanent, unalterable, and eternal; and present in every possible world. Classical humanism has an essentialist conception of the human being, which means that it believes in an eternal and unchangeable human nature. This viewpoint has been criticized by Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, and many modern and existential thinkers.
posted by sophist at 11:01 PM on April 2, 2009
From wiki:
In philosophy, essentialism is the view that, for any specific kind of entity, there is a set of characteristics or properties all of which any entity of that kind must possess. This view is contrasted with non-essentialism, which states that, for any given kind of entity, there are no specific traits which entities of that kind must possess.
According to essentialism, a member of a specific kind of entity may possess other characteristics that are neither needed to establish its membership nor preclude its membership, but that essences do not simply reflect ways of grouping objects; essences must result in properties of the object.
An essence characterizes a substance or a form, in the sense of the Forms or Ideas in Platonic idealism. It is permanent, unalterable, and eternal; and present in every possible world. Classical humanism has an essentialist conception of the human being, which means that it believes in an eternal and unchangeable human nature. This viewpoint has been criticized by Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, and many modern and existential thinkers.
posted by sophist at 11:01 PM on April 2, 2009
suedehead: I see this declaration of a objective and universal standard of taste/beauty as generating a definition of art that is ultimately essentialist -- "since beauty is a universal, fixed concept, I can perceive that this creation doesn't contain the essence of beauty".
Chocolate Pickle: For whatever it's worth, that's empirically disprovable. There are many, many things that some think are beautiful and others think are trash... By the same token, I'm hard pressed to think of anything that absolutely everyone would agree is beautiful... If there is some universal fixed concept called "beauty" then it's useless, and largely irrelevant, because most people don't agree with it, and have their own meaning for the word.
Not that I have anything fantabulous invested in the concept of an essence of beauty, but this argument has some problems with it. There may be an essential beauty that 'most people' don't understand, and there may be an essential beauty that is difficult to uncover. There are several things a word signifies; primarily, the thing itself, but secondarily, what that thing itself is understood to be. Everyone will agree that 'the Truth' consists in the collection of all statements about the world which are correct, or something like that; but we can argue all day about what Truth is in its essence. Similarly, everyone understands that 'beauty' is something like 'that which is pleasing to the senses,' but people at large may not understand what beauty in its essence is.
And as far as the concept being 'useless' if most people don't agree with it or understand it, well, you argued just above that the utility of a proposition has nothing to do with its validity. So it doesn't really matter whether it's useful; it matters whether it's true.
posted by koeselitz at 11:07 PM on April 2, 2009
Chocolate Pickle: For whatever it's worth, that's empirically disprovable. There are many, many things that some think are beautiful and others think are trash... By the same token, I'm hard pressed to think of anything that absolutely everyone would agree is beautiful... If there is some universal fixed concept called "beauty" then it's useless, and largely irrelevant, because most people don't agree with it, and have their own meaning for the word.
Not that I have anything fantabulous invested in the concept of an essence of beauty, but this argument has some problems with it. There may be an essential beauty that 'most people' don't understand, and there may be an essential beauty that is difficult to uncover. There are several things a word signifies; primarily, the thing itself, but secondarily, what that thing itself is understood to be. Everyone will agree that 'the Truth' consists in the collection of all statements about the world which are correct, or something like that; but we can argue all day about what Truth is in its essence. Similarly, everyone understands that 'beauty' is something like 'that which is pleasing to the senses,' but people at large may not understand what beauty in its essence is.
And as far as the concept being 'useless' if most people don't agree with it or understand it, well, you argued just above that the utility of a proposition has nothing to do with its validity. So it doesn't really matter whether it's useful; it matters whether it's true.
posted by koeselitz at 11:07 PM on April 2, 2009
sophist: If I understand it correctly, Essentialism is the idea that things in the world have an "essence", that a human is at some metaphysical level somehow different than a rock, that objects in the world possess essential properties which are more than just a random collection of particles floating around. This idea has always struck as particularly wrongheaded, but it pops up all over the place in philosophy, from philosophy of language to history to politics, mind, etc.
Essential properties? Like: an object in motion has a velocity, or a liquid has a temperature?
posted by koeselitz at 11:11 PM on April 2, 2009
Essential properties? Like: an object in motion has a velocity, or a liquid has a temperature?
posted by koeselitz at 11:11 PM on April 2, 2009
Also, if that quotation from Wikipedia purports to be an explication of the 'essentialism' of Aristotle and Plato, then it's pretty woefully inaccurate.
posted by koeselitz at 11:17 PM on April 2, 2009
posted by koeselitz at 11:17 PM on April 2, 2009
Response by poster: Essential properties? Like: an object in motion has a velocity, or a liquid has a temperature?
Well, to be accurate, I'd say that most scientists would agree that velocity and temperature aren't essences but relationships between objects, or the activity of the object itself. Molecules don't 'contain' a velocity or temperature. Maybe the belief that humans have essences (i.e. souls) is a half-decent example.
As for dialectical materialism -- I take it to mean a way of thinking that assumes things are not fixed but fluid and changing, and also dependent on material/social/historical conditions. Trotsky(!) summarizes: "Dialectical thinking analyses all things and phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in the material conditions of those changes that critical limit beyond which A ceases to be A." It's sort of hard because it seems relatively obvious now to conceive of X within its historical conditions, and to understand that X changes in time.
posted by suedehead at 11:27 PM on April 2, 2009
Well, to be accurate, I'd say that most scientists would agree that velocity and temperature aren't essences but relationships between objects, or the activity of the object itself. Molecules don't 'contain' a velocity or temperature. Maybe the belief that humans have essences (i.e. souls) is a half-decent example.
As for dialectical materialism -- I take it to mean a way of thinking that assumes things are not fixed but fluid and changing, and also dependent on material/social/historical conditions. Trotsky(!) summarizes: "Dialectical thinking analyses all things and phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in the material conditions of those changes that critical limit beyond which A ceases to be A." It's sort of hard because it seems relatively obvious now to conceive of X within its historical conditions, and to understand that X changes in time.
posted by suedehead at 11:27 PM on April 2, 2009
Essentialist arguments are ontological, meaning they ask "how do we know what exists?", while arguments that could be labeled nonessentialist have tended not toward exposing flaws in ontological positions but instead toward problematizing the idea that language can accurately represent reality itself, which is an epistemological question (i.e. "how do we know?").
The idea of a "coherent" argument against essentialism is not without irony, because there is a certain amount of necessary incoherence in such arguments that problematize language. Derrida and Barthes had more fun with this than most, but here are some good texts as well:
Nietzsche in 1873: "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" - Nietzsche famously criticizes the idea of objective truth and instead claims that truth is only a matter of individual perspective, and most people are deceived into believing certain truths.
Martin Heidegger in 1927: Being and Time (wikipedia link) MH is the father, so to say, of those who have been lumped together as poststructuralists. Being and Time problematizes philosophy and language, and is perhaps the most influential work of metacriticism from the 20th century.
Robert L. Scott in 1967: "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic" (There's only a synopsis and discussion here; no original source.) This is a short, cute essay (not without its flaws) that resurrects Sophistic epistemology which maintains that knowledge is created by rhetoric, rather than the Platonic view which holds that knowledge comes from observable phenomena.
Hayden White in 1976: "The Absurdist Moment in Contemporary Critical Theory" (JStor link) - Any philosophizing on the problem of imposing meaning on an object is itself problematic because it too uses language to convey meaning.
posted by hpliferaft at 11:32 PM on April 2, 2009 [1 favorite]
The idea of a "coherent" argument against essentialism is not without irony, because there is a certain amount of necessary incoherence in such arguments that problematize language. Derrida and Barthes had more fun with this than most, but here are some good texts as well:
Nietzsche in 1873: "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" - Nietzsche famously criticizes the idea of objective truth and instead claims that truth is only a matter of individual perspective, and most people are deceived into believing certain truths.
Martin Heidegger in 1927: Being and Time (wikipedia link) MH is the father, so to say, of those who have been lumped together as poststructuralists. Being and Time problematizes philosophy and language, and is perhaps the most influential work of metacriticism from the 20th century.
Robert L. Scott in 1967: "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic" (There's only a synopsis and discussion here; no original source.) This is a short, cute essay (not without its flaws) that resurrects Sophistic epistemology which maintains that knowledge is created by rhetoric, rather than the Platonic view which holds that knowledge comes from observable phenomena.
Hayden White in 1976: "The Absurdist Moment in Contemporary Critical Theory" (JStor link) - Any philosophizing on the problem of imposing meaning on an object is itself problematic because it too uses language to convey meaning.
posted by hpliferaft at 11:32 PM on April 2, 2009 [1 favorite]
Just a bit of perspective on the mother and child thing, if you start from a non-creationist premise and accept that humans developed through Survival of the Fittest, you will realise that the universe does not intrinsically prioritise or value ANY individual's life, and that therefore the question of the rights of the foetus against those of its incubator are purely a human social creation. As indeed is the notion of 'rights' in itself.
posted by fearnothing at 11:37 PM on April 2, 2009
posted by fearnothing at 11:37 PM on April 2, 2009
Response by poster: The idea of a "coherent" argument against essentialism is not without irony, because there is a certain amount of necessary incoherence in such arguments that problematize language.
Really good point, and thanks a bunch for the links.
But there's a reiteration of the same opposition. If I think that language is fixed and definite, does accurately represent reality, and that certain words represent the essence of certain meanings, then I will oppose this problematization, no? The problematization is done with the methodological tools of a way of thinking that are already against what it will argue against. And this is the case for anything else -- I argue the truth (or even the absence or a constructed-ness of a truth) of something using methods of thought that I already believe in.
I think that Derrida talks about this when he talks about 'bricolage' -- "the necessity of borrowing one's concept from the text of a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined"; a way of using a certain way of thinking to break away from that way of thinking itself. But he weasles out of this lamely by saying 'well, there's no getting out of it', and I think in one other essay he even says something along the lines of 'well, there are better forms of bricolage, and worse forms of bricolage' and leaves it at that.
I don't want to turn this into chatfilter -- my core question is: how do you argue against some other method of thought without the basis of your argument ultimately being opinion? The applied argument would be: is an opposition between essentialism and anti-essentialism, 'in the end', also formed only on opinion?
posted by suedehead at 11:55 PM on April 2, 2009
Really good point, and thanks a bunch for the links.
But there's a reiteration of the same opposition. If I think that language is fixed and definite, does accurately represent reality, and that certain words represent the essence of certain meanings, then I will oppose this problematization, no? The problematization is done with the methodological tools of a way of thinking that are already against what it will argue against. And this is the case for anything else -- I argue the truth (or even the absence or a constructed-ness of a truth) of something using methods of thought that I already believe in.
I think that Derrida talks about this when he talks about 'bricolage' -- "the necessity of borrowing one's concept from the text of a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined"; a way of using a certain way of thinking to break away from that way of thinking itself. But he weasles out of this lamely by saying 'well, there's no getting out of it', and I think in one other essay he even says something along the lines of 'well, there are better forms of bricolage, and worse forms of bricolage' and leaves it at that.
I don't want to turn this into chatfilter -- my core question is: how do you argue against some other method of thought without the basis of your argument ultimately being opinion? The applied argument would be: is an opposition between essentialism and anti-essentialism, 'in the end', also formed only on opinion?
posted by suedehead at 11:55 PM on April 2, 2009
suedehead: Well, to be accurate, I'd say that most scientists would agree that velocity and temperature aren't essences but relationships between objects, or the activity of the object itself.
Then in what sense can they be called 'objects'? Can they become non-objects? Is objectness essential to them?
posted by koeselitz at 12:02 AM on April 3, 2009
Then in what sense can they be called 'objects'? Can they become non-objects? Is objectness essential to them?
posted by koeselitz at 12:02 AM on April 3, 2009
It's just very hard for me to see anything like science as 'non-essentialist.'
posted by koeselitz at 12:03 AM on April 3, 2009
posted by koeselitz at 12:03 AM on April 3, 2009
how do you argue against some other method of thought without the basis of your argument ultimately being opinion?
Forgive me if I betray some ignorance about the subject, but isn't this anxiety made moot by dialectical materialism? In other words, you only worry about the authority of your interpretation if you believe that single interpretations can accurately capture the essence of thing they interpret.
It seems to me that the more important project is demonstrating that all arguments are opinion, at some level.
posted by billtron at 5:49 AM on April 3, 2009
Forgive me if I betray some ignorance about the subject, but isn't this anxiety made moot by dialectical materialism? In other words, you only worry about the authority of your interpretation if you believe that single interpretations can accurately capture the essence of thing they interpret.
It seems to me that the more important project is demonstrating that all arguments are opinion, at some level.
posted by billtron at 5:49 AM on April 3, 2009
I think essentialism and universal aestheticism are two pretty different ideas, and your equation of them is a bit confusing. It would help to get your details straight before you start throwing around so many names and pieces of terminology
also,
For people following a Kantian aesthetics, the notion of materialism concerning beauty and art is wrong -- because beauty is objective, detached, universal.
You need to reread the Third Critique. Beauty is explicitly subjective, but universal, according to Kant. Nothing is beautiful in-itself; it is the relationship between the imagination and the understanding in the human subject which causes the experience of beauty. Also, beauty is not an experience of art for Kant, but of nature. Basically, Kant thinks that the "free play" between the capacities of imagination and understanding create the sensation of aesthetic pleasure, and that these capacities are basically universal.
HOwever, he does argue that it can be more and less well-developed, just as the capacities can be. So, no one is going to think a pile of dog shit is beautiful as a direct aesthetic experience, and everyone is going to think a rose is, but some will appreciate that beauty more profoundly. Why? There is no rational reason to find a rose beautiful... This book is his explanation for that universality.
The exploration of why art differs from natural beauty isn't that much of a focus for Kant, though he does mention it, and it involves the expression of ideas. A pile of dog shit could somehow become artistically intriguing to some for different reasons than direct aesthetics...
But, if you are going to disagree with the idea that our aesthetic sense is universal by nature rather than culture - that is, that in a different culture we could have grown up to find the rose distasteful and the dogshit beautiful - it is the notion that all humans have the same capacities, or the notion that the interaction of those capacities causes this feeling, which you need to disagree with. He never claims the rose is beautiful, nor that everyone has a developed aesthetic sense, only that once it is developed, we will find those things with order and "merely formal purposiveness" beautiful. It seems like where you would want to go is something like claiming that order or form itself is projected or differently interpreted according to social standards...
posted by mdn at 9:58 AM on April 3, 2009 [1 favorite]
also,
For people following a Kantian aesthetics, the notion of materialism concerning beauty and art is wrong -- because beauty is objective, detached, universal.
You need to reread the Third Critique. Beauty is explicitly subjective, but universal, according to Kant. Nothing is beautiful in-itself; it is the relationship between the imagination and the understanding in the human subject which causes the experience of beauty. Also, beauty is not an experience of art for Kant, but of nature. Basically, Kant thinks that the "free play" between the capacities of imagination and understanding create the sensation of aesthetic pleasure, and that these capacities are basically universal.
HOwever, he does argue that it can be more and less well-developed, just as the capacities can be. So, no one is going to think a pile of dog shit is beautiful as a direct aesthetic experience, and everyone is going to think a rose is, but some will appreciate that beauty more profoundly. Why? There is no rational reason to find a rose beautiful... This book is his explanation for that universality.
The exploration of why art differs from natural beauty isn't that much of a focus for Kant, though he does mention it, and it involves the expression of ideas. A pile of dog shit could somehow become artistically intriguing to some for different reasons than direct aesthetics...
But, if you are going to disagree with the idea that our aesthetic sense is universal by nature rather than culture - that is, that in a different culture we could have grown up to find the rose distasteful and the dogshit beautiful - it is the notion that all humans have the same capacities, or the notion that the interaction of those capacities causes this feeling, which you need to disagree with. He never claims the rose is beautiful, nor that everyone has a developed aesthetic sense, only that once it is developed, we will find those things with order and "merely formal purposiveness" beautiful. It seems like where you would want to go is something like claiming that order or form itself is projected or differently interpreted according to social standards...
posted by mdn at 9:58 AM on April 3, 2009 [1 favorite]
Response by poster: Ah, I see. So tell me if I got this right -- beauty is subjective, constituted from a play between imagination and understanding, but the assumed homogeneity of all people in terms of mental capacity and the fact that beauty is detached from logic or interest means that everyone's aesthetic sense is the same and thus universal?
posted by suedehead at 10:10 AM on April 3, 2009
posted by suedehead at 10:10 AM on April 3, 2009
Yeah, basically. there isn't a complete homogeneity in that one can have stronger or weaker understanding, e.g., but understanding itself is a capacity which only works a certain way (it is the capacity to conceptualize or "grasp"). Likewise, imagination is the capacity to re/produce a sensation (or image) in the mind. Kant argues the capacities that are the basics of the human mind & that the structure of the mind is fundamentally universal in the first critique...
my core question is: how do you argue against some other method of thought without the basis of your argument ultimately being opinion? The applied argument would be: is an opposition between essentialism and anti-essentialism, 'in the end', also formed only on opinion?
It depends what you mean by opinion. Arguments in the social sciences are generally formed by a writer having a thesis, and explaining why they have reached this thesis, why they reject counter-arguments, etc. This is logic, analysis, some amount of empirical or theoretical examples - it isn't baseless opinion, but it isn't simple fact. Of course, most social scientists think very little is "simple fact" - philosophers argue over what we can determine to be a fact all the time. So is everything just opinion? All shared knowledge is perspectival and linguistically represented, if you like. (taking knowledge strictly, not saying there are no non-linguistic forms of shared communication)
Does that get at your question? or did i miss the point?
posted by mdn at 3:34 PM on April 3, 2009
my core question is: how do you argue against some other method of thought without the basis of your argument ultimately being opinion? The applied argument would be: is an opposition between essentialism and anti-essentialism, 'in the end', also formed only on opinion?
It depends what you mean by opinion. Arguments in the social sciences are generally formed by a writer having a thesis, and explaining why they have reached this thesis, why they reject counter-arguments, etc. This is logic, analysis, some amount of empirical or theoretical examples - it isn't baseless opinion, but it isn't simple fact. Of course, most social scientists think very little is "simple fact" - philosophers argue over what we can determine to be a fact all the time. So is everything just opinion? All shared knowledge is perspectival and linguistically represented, if you like. (taking knowledge strictly, not saying there are no non-linguistic forms of shared communication)
Does that get at your question? or did i miss the point?
posted by mdn at 3:34 PM on April 3, 2009
This thread is closed to new comments.
posted by Beardman at 9:39 PM on April 2, 2009