Looking for literature that explains explanation
October 20, 2010 2:23 PM Subscribe
Looking for philosophers/social theorists, both classic and modern, who have written about what it means to "explain" something.
There's a paper I want to write but I'm not sure where to even begin with my research. I think one of the key issues I need to use as a jumping-off-point is the nature of "explanation," and what it can mean in different contexts and maybe even different disciplines. I've read things that are kind of tangential to the topic, but I'm hoping some theorists have written about this in greater depth.
I'm having a difficult time articulating what I mean here, so perhaps an example would be good. Superficially, it seems to me that there is a difference between these things:
-Describing the series of events that led to the current outcome
-Describing the causal relationship between those events (a more mechanistic description)
-Explaining why the current outcome occurred, as opposed to some other outcome
-Justifying the current outcome as "appropriate" or "good" in some way
...But they could all arguably be described as "explaining." So there is some ambiguity built in to the nature of explaining, at least in English (I have no idea if other languages make clear delineations between all of these concepts).
And as an example that is less intertwined with language, different disciplines obviously have different ways of explaining things. If you described the same scenario to, say, an anthropologist, an economist, and an evolutionary psychologist, and asked them "What's really going on here?", the answers you would get from each person would be very different, at least in part because each discipline has a different understanding of what it means to explain human behavior.
I'm certain that I'm not the first person to have thought about this, but I don't know where to look for literature. It seems like the sort of thing Hume might have written about. And maybe Bateson, or some other cyberneticist. I see shades of it in much of the literature I've read on "agency." There's a big intersection between "explanatory modes" and "models of causality," and I feel like I'm decently well-versed in the latter (or at least would know where to look to become well-versed), but the two don't overlap perfectly. I haven't yet stumbled across anyone who explicitly talks about the nature of explanation, and I don't even know what vocabulary I should be using to search for this kind of stuff (if a vocabulary even exists, that is).
So: literature suggestions? I'm interested in both modern stuff and older stuff, even if it's somewhat misguided. Apologies if my question is unclear; I'm still at the stage where I don't even know what questions I should be asking to get the information I ultimately need.
There's a paper I want to write but I'm not sure where to even begin with my research. I think one of the key issues I need to use as a jumping-off-point is the nature of "explanation," and what it can mean in different contexts and maybe even different disciplines. I've read things that are kind of tangential to the topic, but I'm hoping some theorists have written about this in greater depth.
I'm having a difficult time articulating what I mean here, so perhaps an example would be good. Superficially, it seems to me that there is a difference between these things:
-Describing the series of events that led to the current outcome
-Describing the causal relationship between those events (a more mechanistic description)
-Explaining why the current outcome occurred, as opposed to some other outcome
-Justifying the current outcome as "appropriate" or "good" in some way
...But they could all arguably be described as "explaining." So there is some ambiguity built in to the nature of explaining, at least in English (I have no idea if other languages make clear delineations between all of these concepts).
And as an example that is less intertwined with language, different disciplines obviously have different ways of explaining things. If you described the same scenario to, say, an anthropologist, an economist, and an evolutionary psychologist, and asked them "What's really going on here?", the answers you would get from each person would be very different, at least in part because each discipline has a different understanding of what it means to explain human behavior.
I'm certain that I'm not the first person to have thought about this, but I don't know where to look for literature. It seems like the sort of thing Hume might have written about. And maybe Bateson, or some other cyberneticist. I see shades of it in much of the literature I've read on "agency." There's a big intersection between "explanatory modes" and "models of causality," and I feel like I'm decently well-versed in the latter (or at least would know where to look to become well-versed), but the two don't overlap perfectly. I haven't yet stumbled across anyone who explicitly talks about the nature of explanation, and I don't even know what vocabulary I should be using to search for this kind of stuff (if a vocabulary even exists, that is).
So: literature suggestions? I'm interested in both modern stuff and older stuff, even if it's somewhat misguided. Apologies if my question is unclear; I'm still at the stage where I don't even know what questions I should be asking to get the information I ultimately need.
The internet encyclopedia of philosophy entry seems pretty good too.
Note that most of these philosophers are careful to circumscribe their theories to scientific explanation. Some of them think you'll need a separate theory to explain, say, mathematical explanation, but many are hoping for a unified theory of explanation in general.
posted by painquale at 2:52 PM on October 20, 2010
Note that most of these philosophers are careful to circumscribe their theories to scientific explanation. Some of them think you'll need a separate theory to explain, say, mathematical explanation, but many are hoping for a unified theory of explanation in general.
posted by painquale at 2:52 PM on October 20, 2010
Well, one approach that comes to mind is that you can start with the PSR and work your way up. Leibniz and Spinoza can be difficult to slog through at times, but the Principle of Sufficient Reason is a decent foundation if you're looking for causal relationship. Once you leave PSR territory, you could go to British Empiricism (Hume, Berkeley, etc.) and then from there...well, there's always Bertrand Russell.
Another approach is to dip your toe into hermeneutics. This is mostly concerned with interpretation, sure, but explication is reliant upon interpretation one could argue. Here, you'd turn to Gadamer, or Ricoeur...maybe Heidegger, but he's more concerned with truth than explication.
Hope this helps.
posted by donquixote at 4:08 PM on October 20, 2010
Another approach is to dip your toe into hermeneutics. This is mostly concerned with interpretation, sure, but explication is reliant upon interpretation one could argue. Here, you'd turn to Gadamer, or Ricoeur...maybe Heidegger, but he's more concerned with truth than explication.
Hope this helps.
posted by donquixote at 4:08 PM on October 20, 2010
This is a bit oblique, but take a look at Hayden White's "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality." Its a historiographical piece on the role of rhetoric in historical explanation.
posted by googly at 4:45 PM on October 20, 2010
posted by googly at 4:45 PM on October 20, 2010
Check out Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He thinks that philosophy too often tries to explain/analyze/penetrate what only needs to be described, and therefore advocates explanations that are parallel to the phenomena explained rather than at a subterranean level as 'real structures' or 'essences,' etc.
In other words, he offers an argument (standing against centuries of attempts to find the deeper structures & rules of language and meaning) against questions like 'what's really going on here?' that might be helpful in thinking about not only answering those questions but also why we want to ask them in the first place. A representative quotation, hopefully somewhat comprehensible out of context: "For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model [that is, the theory] as what it is, as an object of comparison--as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond." (PI, ยง131)
Here 'to which reality must correspond' means something like 'which we feel must be true on the basis of our inferences and analysis' despite contorted/counterintuitive description of the actual phenomena (e.g. language) in question. The idea is that philosophers get so attached to making up structures and categories and essential properties and necessary and sufficient conditions for things that they forget to actually look at the things they're trying to explain and end up pretty much disconnected from actual practice.
Hopefully this is along the lines of what you're looking for. I would also second donquixote's suggestion that you take a look at hermeneutics in general and Ricoeur/Gadamer in particular. That stuff would probably be really useful for what you want to do.
posted by roast beef at 5:36 PM on October 20, 2010
In other words, he offers an argument (standing against centuries of attempts to find the deeper structures & rules of language and meaning) against questions like 'what's really going on here?' that might be helpful in thinking about not only answering those questions but also why we want to ask them in the first place. A representative quotation, hopefully somewhat comprehensible out of context: "For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model [that is, the theory] as what it is, as an object of comparison--as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond." (PI, ยง131)
Here 'to which reality must correspond' means something like 'which we feel must be true on the basis of our inferences and analysis' despite contorted/counterintuitive description of the actual phenomena (e.g. language) in question. The idea is that philosophers get so attached to making up structures and categories and essential properties and necessary and sufficient conditions for things that they forget to actually look at the things they're trying to explain and end up pretty much disconnected from actual practice.
Hopefully this is along the lines of what you're looking for. I would also second donquixote's suggestion that you take a look at hermeneutics in general and Ricoeur/Gadamer in particular. That stuff would probably be really useful for what you want to do.
posted by roast beef at 5:36 PM on October 20, 2010
Thanks, Roast Beef!
posted by wittgenstein at 6:27 PM on October 20, 2010 [1 favorite]
posted by wittgenstein at 6:27 PM on October 20, 2010 [1 favorite]
I think what you have above are a series of concepts that can variously be described in terms of explanation, but which have different characters when looked at not in terms of explanation. For instance you have questions describing the what of explaining, in your four bullets; and then you also have a description of how explanation varies depending on someone's background. It would be good to pick one of them for a focus.
The latter is definitely an area where Wittgenstein might be useful. Very basically, he looks at what it means to be able to share meaning between two or more people. In his latter work in Philosophical Investigations he might support the idea that say, an anthropologist, an economist, and an evolutionary psychologist, looking at the same phenomenon, would give different explanations, but also that their individual explanations might be different and not necessarily mutually intelligible.
This would be because each discipline has a different way of looking at things that is acquired over years of learning. So what Wittgenstein does (amongst other things) is provide some discussions of the conditions under which meaning can be mutually intelligible - and he would say that this can occur in (what he calls) a shared language game, and in shared ways of life.
Obviously it is hugely more complex than this, but doing some reading around Wittgenstein and meaning, might lead you into some interesting thoughts on how meanings are shared and explained (or not shared and explained) amongst people.
posted by carter at 7:02 PM on October 20, 2010
The latter is definitely an area where Wittgenstein might be useful. Very basically, he looks at what it means to be able to share meaning between two or more people. In his latter work in Philosophical Investigations he might support the idea that say, an anthropologist, an economist, and an evolutionary psychologist, looking at the same phenomenon, would give different explanations, but also that their individual explanations might be different and not necessarily mutually intelligible.
This would be because each discipline has a different way of looking at things that is acquired over years of learning. So what Wittgenstein does (amongst other things) is provide some discussions of the conditions under which meaning can be mutually intelligible - and he would say that this can occur in (what he calls) a shared language game, and in shared ways of life.
Obviously it is hugely more complex than this, but doing some reading around Wittgenstein and meaning, might lead you into some interesting thoughts on how meanings are shared and explained (or not shared and explained) amongst people.
posted by carter at 7:02 PM on October 20, 2010
There's been a lot of work on explanation in contemporary analytic philosophy of science. Peter Lipton's work would be a great place to start. See this and this.
posted by Acheman at 5:40 AM on October 21, 2010
posted by Acheman at 5:40 AM on October 21, 2010
A good place to look for the origins of theories of explanation is in Aristotle's four causes. What we think of as causation is actually just one of his causes (material cause). They're better thought of as the types of answers to why questions.
posted by painquale at 3:46 PM on October 21, 2010
posted by painquale at 3:46 PM on October 21, 2010
In the Theaetetus Plato discusses the nature of justification (or "giving an account of"). It's presented as one of the conditions for knowledge, but it's also a good and brief primer on causation.
Aristotle is definitely also a good place to start, however.
Painquale, it's been a while since I read Aristotle's metaphysics, but isn't the efficient cause the one that most think of in the modern meaning of causation?
posted by oddman at 2:41 PM on November 10, 2010
Aristotle is definitely also a good place to start, however.
Painquale, it's been a while since I read Aristotle's metaphysics, but isn't the efficient cause the one that most think of in the modern meaning of causation?
posted by oddman at 2:41 PM on November 10, 2010
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posted by painquale at 2:47 PM on October 20, 2010 [1 favorite]