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Do other countries allow the Head of Government to pardon people convicted of crimes the way the USA does?

edavidoff — Sun, 20 Sep 2009 15:06:36 -0800

Do other countries allow the Head of Government to pardon people convicted of crimes the way the USA does? The President of the United States can pardon any person who has committed a federal crime, except in cases of impeachment, as outlined in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Do any other more-or-less democratic countries give their Head of Government or, where such a position exists, the Head of State, to overrule the courts by granting a pardon to anybody they like?

Can Bush Refuse an Obama Pardon?

Ironmouth — Mon, 17 Nov 2008 19:45:05 -0800

May George W. Bush refuse a pardon from Barack Obama? Imagine that Barack Obama's first act is to pardon George W. Bush for all the illegal acts he committed during his term. Could Bush refuse such a pardon? Would his refusal mean that he could still assert his Fifth Amendment right to not be required to incriminate himself? Or would he be required to testify before any committee to call him up? (assuming Bush fails in his inevitable assertion of executive privilege).

For that matter, can any other pardon-refusing potential witness before Congress or other body with subpoena power still claim Fifth Amendment rights to avoid incriminating themselves and thereby avoid testifying?

I'm a lawyer, so give me hard details if they exist. Google is no help.

Well t'aint a pardon, and t'aint attainder...

dsword — Thu, 24 Jan 2008 07:26:43 -0800

Two to three questions involving the pending FISA bill--specifically the immunity provisions. 1)
The Constitution expressly forbids Congress from passing bills of attainder, which punish individuals or groups of individuals without trial. Is there a similar term describing laws which single out individuals or groups of individuals for some benefit--either material or legal? One example I have in mind would be the current FISA bill (which includes a provision of immunity for telecoms), although I suppose that under a loose interpretation, earmarks for local or state governments might also be included in this category. Are there examples of these sorts of laws being overturned. If so, on what grounds, and what is the prevailing legal standard for overturning such statutes?

2)
(a) Why is the current administration trying to push telecom immunity through Congress, when the power to pardon is expressly and without qualification granted to the President by the Constitution? What prevents Bush from simply granting immunity from prosecution to the relevant individuals and/or corporations?

(b) If the answer to part (a) happens to be that "the pardon wouldn't extend to civil cases" (would it?) would it not be considered an act of attainder for Congress to strip telecom customers of the right to sue?

To be clear, I'm looking for legal arguments and explanations, preferably with caselaw and/or code citations (not Bush and/or Congress bashing).

Libby v. Nixon?

spiderwire — Wed, 04 Jul 2007 01:26:03 -0800

Is there a parallel between the Special Prosecutor problem in US v. Nixon and the commutation of a sentence imposed pursuant to a Special Prosecutor investigation, as in the case of "Scooter" Libby? [more inside] I've been asking this question around to anyone I thought could answer it -- to no avail -- so I decided I might as well bring it here, as well. I'm honestly curious what I'm missing here -- either the question is critical to the Libby issue, or I'm nuts, and if I'm nuts, I'd like to know why. I'd like to make it clear up front that I'm not trying to bait anyone here -- I'm going to be defending this position, and I need to test if its tenable.

The question is: How does commuting Libby's sentence square with U.S. v. Nixon? According to the GAO, Fitzgerald's appointment by Comey reads:

"By the authority vested in the Attorney General by law, including 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 515, and in my capacity as Acting Attorney General pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 508, I hereby delegate to you all the authority of the Attorney General with respect to the Department's investigation into the alleged unauthorized disclosure of a CIA employee's identity, and I direct you to exercise that authority as Special Counsel independent of the supervision or control of any officer of the Department.

In February 2004, Acting Attorney General Comey clarified Special Counsel Fitzgerald's delegation of authority to state that the authority previously delegated to him is plenary. It also states, 'Further, my conferral on you of the title of Special Counsel' in this matter should not be misunderstood to suggest that your position and authorities are defined and limited by 28 CFR Part 600.'"

That seems to me to directly track Nixon, which reads, in relevant part:

"So long as this regulation is extant it has the force of law. In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), regulations of the Attorney General delegated certain of his discretionary powers to the Board [418 U.S. 683, 696] of Immigration Appeals and required that Board to exercise its own discretion on appeals in deportation cases. The Court held that so long as the Attorney General's regulations remained operative, he denied himself the authority to exercise the discretion delegated to the Board even though the original authority was his and he could reassert it by amending the regulations. ...

Here, as in Accardi, it is theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's authority. But he has not done so. So long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect and to enforce it."

That was the rationale for why Nixon couldn't escape the Special Prosecutor's investigation -- I don't see why the same rationale doesn't apply here, particularly given that Knute and a few other cases explicitly limit the pardon power when it interferes with vested rights, which Fitzgerald has under Nixon and Marbury at the very least.

But this can't be right. I haven't seen this discussed elsewhere in the Libbystorm. What am I missing here? I'd like to go talk with some of my profs about this later in the week, so for the sake of my preparation, any pontifications y'all have are most welcome.