Subtler Disdain for America
May 14, 2007 5:40 PM Subscribe
Partly inspired by this question, what are some examples of Europe's subtler disdains of American culture in the 60s and 70s?
To put it differently and more focused on my research purposes , where can I find commentary on France's/Italy's anti-American response to the information gathered in Servan-Schrieber's The American Challenge ?
In a way, this has to do with stereotyping. (e.g. the American who is always in a rush, or is always working.) Thanks for your help.
In a way, this has to do with stereotyping. (e.g. the American who is always in a rush, or is always working.) Thanks for your help.
You might find some useful material in Philippe Roger's book L'Ennemi Americain, recently translated into English as The American Enemy: The History of French Anti-Americanism. Roger's book was overshadowed by Jean-Francois Revel's L'Obsession Anti-Americaine when it first appeared, but now seems to be recognised as the better of the two books. (Reviews here and here.) Roger argues that French anti-Americanism predates Gaullism, and traces it back to the time of the Spanish-American War (indeed further -- but he sees the Spanish-American War as a key turning-point).
I'm very interested in paulsc's comments, many of which ring true. Looking at the subject from a British perspective, however, one is inclined to look more favourably on De Gaulle, who -- unlike the British -- was quick to recognise America as a political/economic/cultural competitor, without being deceived by rosy visions of a 'special relationship' (or Macmillan's belief in a civilizing mission: 'we are the Greeks to America's Rome'). Of course, De Gaulle was mistaken in believing that French colonialism was sustainable in post-war conditions -- but then the British made the same mistake. (And all the examples that paulsc gives of policies that 'inherently' put France in opposition to America -- the independent nuclear deterrent, the nuclear power programme, the resistance to European integration -- could be paralleled in Britain, only without the same anti-American baggage. Which suggests to me that Philippe Roger is right, and that French anti-Americanism is more of a cultural thing, not simply the result of post-war politics.)
posted by verstegan at 1:33 AM on May 15, 2007
I'm very interested in paulsc's comments, many of which ring true. Looking at the subject from a British perspective, however, one is inclined to look more favourably on De Gaulle, who -- unlike the British -- was quick to recognise America as a political/economic/cultural competitor, without being deceived by rosy visions of a 'special relationship' (or Macmillan's belief in a civilizing mission: 'we are the Greeks to America's Rome'). Of course, De Gaulle was mistaken in believing that French colonialism was sustainable in post-war conditions -- but then the British made the same mistake. (And all the examples that paulsc gives of policies that 'inherently' put France in opposition to America -- the independent nuclear deterrent, the nuclear power programme, the resistance to European integration -- could be paralleled in Britain, only without the same anti-American baggage. Which suggests to me that Philippe Roger is right, and that French anti-Americanism is more of a cultural thing, not simply the result of post-war politics.)
posted by verstegan at 1:33 AM on May 15, 2007
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I think that Servan-Scherieber's economic arguments were less anti-American, than anti-French (and by extension, European) complacency. The Gaullists thought, at least through the early 60's, that France should and could act as Europe's leader, and as a peer to the U.S. in the international arena. De Gaulle remained suspicious of NATO as long as he remained in power, and was committed for far, far too long to the continuation of French colonialism. Servan-Schrieber's view point was that colonialism was unsustainable and actually detrimental to the development of France's new post war roles in a more integrated EC. He also thought that French industry and agriculture could not hide behind tariff barriers indefinitely. He did not fear dilution of French influence in a larger European community, and thought enough of American ideas of management to arrange to have his own children educated in American universities. Many of Servan-Schrieber's views continue to be expressed by activists like José Bové.
Not so the Gaullists he criticized and opposed politically. At every turn, throughout the '60s, De Gaulle acted, with the support of the French electorate, to advance French interests without regard to the interests of Europe as a whole. De Gaulle's insistence on French development of atomic weapons outside NATO control, and of a domestic nuclear power program to eliminate French dependence on foriegn oil and coal are good examples of these policies. And right up to the '90s, Gaullists continued to oppose EU actions and the introduction of a common currency and the opening of the EC as a true trading area. Those trends inherently put France into political and sometimes cultural opposition to American policy. French attempts to push NATO policy in certian directions, and French willingness to engage in tariff wars with US agricultural interests remained news items throughout the '60s and '70s. In my opinion, French culture took a decidedly anti-American tilt during much of the '70s because of the Gaullists, and I personally found traveling in France, as an American, on business and pleasure in the late 1970's, both expensive and fairly boorish, compared to other European destinations. Small things perhaps, but constant, such as having my pronounciation of French constantly corrected, as if speaking the language with anything short of a perfect Parisian accent was somehow dirtying it. I delighted in adding an American Southern drawl to every breakfast order in Parisian hotels, as much as they delighted in charging me $8 for a cup of bad French coffee, and $6 for a stale crossiant in return, in 1978, when even a New York hotel wouldn't stiff you $8 for breakfast...
In Italy, the political climate was far more fractituous in the post war period than it was in France, and perhaps because Italy had no De Gaulle, and did have the experience and history of Italian Fascism, there was less interest in NATO participation, and less military re-building than occurred in France. In a very real way, both France and Italy were defeated in WWII, but only France decided to bear the cost of re-militarizing thereafter, particularly due to De Gaulle's vision of France as an ongoing colonial power, and world leading civilization with independent defense needs. John Lamberton Harper's book America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945-1948 describes the immediate post war issues faced by the Americans in occupying and assisting with the reconstruction of Italy, but in general, the American effort given to Italian reconstruction was significantly less, and less well organized, than were the Amerian efforts in Germany and Japan.
In many ways, Italy in the 1950's and early 60's was the beneficiary of American neglect, and allowed to find its own way, politically and economically, to a greater extent than much of the rest of Europe. The constant turnover of Italian governments through the post war period resulted in practical policy paralysis as one center-right coalition after another formed and dissolved in months, leading to new elections, and continued jockeying for power between Christian Democrats, and extremists. Had it not been for the constant efforts in the 60s and 70s of Italian Communists to come to power, Italy might have been even more ignored in American foriegn relations. But left alone by American policy makers as it largely was officially, and faced with a practical domestic leadership vacuum due to its weak central governments, Italy developed vibrant fashion, film and consumer goods segments of its economy, which built Italian national pride as Italians rebuilt the postwar economy in an atmosphere of practical laissez-faire. It was exciting to wear Italian clothes, to drive Italian cars, to attend Italian films and hear Italian music, and this, I think, throughout most of the '60s and '70s, was more due to Italian innovation and competitive drive, than to any disdain by Italians for American ideas or culture. Indeed, Italians were generally great fans of American culture, and in the '70s particularly, for an American, traveling in Italy was fun, funky and cheap. The food was universally good to great, the wines were enjoyable and 1/2 or 1/3 the cost of comparable French vin ordinaire, and you couldn't get better tailoring or leather goods anywhere in the world. On many business trips to Germany, I took extra personal days for Italian adventures, and except for summer visits to Provence and the Rhone valley, I stayed out of France.
posted by paulsc at 12:15 AM on May 15, 2007