SubscribeYoo's most famous piece of advice was in an August 2002 memorandum stating that the president cannot constitutionally be barred from ordering torture in wartime—even though the United States has signed and ratified a treaty absolutely forbidding torture under all circumstances, and even though Congress has passed a law pursuant to that treaty, which without any exceptions prohibits torture. Yoo reasoned that because the Constitution makes the president the "Commander-in-Chief," no law can restrict the actions he may take in pursuit of war. On this reasoning, the president would be entitled by the Constitution to resort to genocide if he wished.Ronald Dworkin, "The Strange Case of Judge Alito":
[Alito] was equally cagey about his past statements on what might turn out to be an even more important constitutional issue: the president's claimed power to ignore congressional statutes in conducting what he considers military operations. A number of senators were particularly worried by Alito's speech to the ultra-conservative Federalist Society in 2000 when he was a sitting judge, in which he said that "when I was in [the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel]...we were strong proponents of the theory of the unitary executive, that all federal executive power is vested by the Constitution in the president. And I thought then, and I still think, that this theory best captures the meaning of the Constitution's text and structure.... The case for a unitary executive seems, if anything, stronger today than it was in the 18th Century."
The phrase "unitary executive" has been much used by conservatives anxious to increase the president's power, particularly in the "war on terrorism." Justice Thomas, for example, appealed to the doctrine to justify his dissent from the Court's refusal, in the Hamdi case, to allow the president unrestricted discretion to hold prisoners indefinitely as enemy combatants. ...
Under traditional principles of statutory construction, these provisions have no binding legal effect. Only material that comes after the so-called "resolving clause"--"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled"--can have any operative effect. Material set out in a whereas clause is purely precatory. It may be relevant for the purpose of clarifying ambiguities in a statute's legally operative terms, but in and of itself such a provision can confer no legal right or obligation.Also, this is the significant part of the Authorization for Use of Military Force:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.The way I read it, this only authorizes military force against nations or organizations that were either involved in the September 11 attacks or harbored organizations or persons that were involved in the attacks.
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posted by oaf at 2:57 PM on February 15, 2006