That the relationship between the "High Contracting Parties" and a non-signatory, the party will remain bound until the non-signatory no longer acts under the strictures of the convention.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.Basically, if two nations are at war, and one is a signatory while the other is not, the signatory nation is bound by the provisions of the Conventions until the non-signatory violates them. Basically, if you're playing by the rules, you get the benefit of the rules, even if you haven't formally recognized them.
Francs-tireurs, insurgents and guerrillas were afforded prisoner of war status by the Third Geneva Convention provided that they carried arms openly, had superiors they were responsible to and distinguished themselves from civilians by a distinctive sign, i.e. an armband.Protocol I is very controversial. Opponents say that it rewards violation of the Third Convention, and in so doing increases the danger to non-combatant civilians.
Protocol I extends these protections offered to Francs-tireurs, insurgents and guerrillas in the Third Geneva Convention by giving them prisoner of war status even if they don't distinguish themselves from the civilian population. Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention requires combatants to have a "fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance"; Protocol I releases lawful combatants from this obligation. Without such distinctive identification lawful combatants can come under attack from enemies posing as civilians without the enemy committing perfidy or affecting the legality of their combat status. Civilians may be more likely to be attacked by combatants who are threatened by an undistinguishable enemy. This is especially relevant in peace keeping operations as whilst civilian police forces are trained to assess a situation and only to fire if certain of their targets' hostile intent, militaries are trained to assess targets and attack if not certain of their peaceful intent.
Protocol I further gives all combatants, lawful under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention or not, an equivalent status to 'prisoner of war' with the same rights and protections, when captured, regardless of their adherence to the laws of war. Whilst prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention is contingent upon adherence to the laws of war, under Protocol I no breach of the laws of war can place an enemy combatant outside the scope of any rights or protections afforded to captured lawful enemy combatants.
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;then you will not be protected by the Conventions as a POW. As the "insurgents" we're rounding up in various places around the world don't generally fulfill any of these categories, the idea that they have forfeited any potential protections of the Conventions is pretty compelling. They are generally subject to almost no command structure, deliberately attempt to blend in with civilians, usually conceal their armaments, and have absolutely no respect for the laws and customs of war (i.e. they deliberately target both hospitals and civilians). Historically, such outlaws would simply be rounded up and summarily executed, with their corpses prominently displayed near the scenes of tehir crimes as a warning to others. But the international human rights movement has been successful in making such expedient and justified moves politically unpalatable. Hence the move towards detention.
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
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Those who wrote the treaty were concerned about the "free rider" problem. Their goal was a noble one: to try to reduce the horrors of war. And they recognized that if the treaty was unconditionally binding on signatories, then it would encourage nations to not sign, because it would give non-signatory nations an advantage when fighting against signatory nations.
So the treaty says that signatories are not bound by provisions of the treaty if their opponents violate those provisions. That is because those who wrote the treaty recognized the value of deterrence as a way of giving non-signatories an incentive to obey the provisions of the convention anyway.
This is one critical way in which the Geneva conventions (and the Hague convention, and certain other related treaties) differ from the ICC treaty, because under the ICC treaty signatories are bound unconditionally even if fighting against someone who violates its provisions. The ICC treaty does not recognize the value of deterrence.
posted by Chocolate Pickle at 3:15 PM on April 8